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Toward Getting Beyond the Blame Game:
A Critique of the Ideology of Voluntarism
in Title VII Jurisprudence
BY SANDI FARRELL*
INTRODUCTION
D espite its relative invisibility, the ideology of voluntarism has
played a critical role in Title VII jurisprudence. In context after
context, the rhetoric of choice and volition has been invoked to deny
individuals with otherwise cognizable claims, relief for the discrimination
experienced in an employment setting. Yet sociology suggests that human
behavior is patterned and not reducible to the decisions of individuals.
Moreover, it is not at all clear that individuals possess the kind of free will
that they are held responsible for exercising or that whatever amount of free
choice individuals do possess is possessed equally by all, at least with
respect to the particular choices at issue in employment discrimination
cases. Thus, the use of voluntarist ideology in Title VII jurisprudence is
deeply problematic and deserves to be exposed and rethought.
Part I of this Article examines the concept of voluntarism, briefly
discussing its philosophical and historical foundations in Western culture
that have made it such a widely and uncritically accepted explanation for
human behavior.2 Part I maps some of the Title VII contexts in which
voluntarism has been a critical factor in shaping the direction and success
of litigation.3 These include sex/gender contexts including dress and
* Madison Fellow, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 2003-
2005. J.D. 2001, Yale Law School; B.A. 1998, Louisiana State University. The
author wishes to thank Professor Vickie Schultz for her assistance and encourage-
ment in writing this Article, and for inspiring the ideas herein by touching upon
voluntarism on several occasions in her Fall 1999 Employment Discrimination
course at the Yale Law School. The author would also like to thank Professor Kenji
Yoshino, without whose guidance, support, and valuable suggestions this Article
could not have been completed.
'Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2003).
2 See discussion infra Part I.
3 See discussion infra Part II.
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grooming standards, sexual orientation and transsexualism, and sexual
harassment; race and national origin contexts including dress and grooming
standards, arrest and conviction records, and language; and in the religion
contexts, accommodating employees' exercise of religion, particularly
religious holidays.
Part MI will attempt to answer the question, "Why voluntarism?"4 This
Part looks briefly at the relevance of equal protection jurisprudence, after
which Title VII was modeled.5 Equal protection jurisprudence is deeply
flawed in its extension of protection to some groups and not others on the
basis of whether characteristics are perceived as voluntarily chosen or
biologically or socially assigned at birth. Other possible explanatory factors
are the dominance of Christianity in American law and society, including
the Christian idea of free will and the American ideology of merit (i.e.,
believing that one's good fortune is the product of her actions, choices, or
intrinsic worth).6 Finally, the role of economics has played a part in the
law's decision to favor employer prerogatives over the meritorious
discrimination claim of the nonconforming employee.7 The Article then
evaluates whether these factors signify a lack of understanding of the
complexities of human behavior or simply a lack of commitment to the
anti-subordination project and an unswerving allegiance to the status
(hierarchy) quo.'
Part IV of the Article argues that the goals of Title VII, properly
understood, are frustrated by the use of voluntarism ideology in deciding
which plaintiffs merit relief under the statute.9 The use of such rhetoric has
helped to gut Title VII, rendering it close to impossible for a plaintiff to win
a case under a statute that was designed to bring about equality of
employment opportunities. It indicates that we live in a world in which it
is easy to blame people for their own misfortunes or adverse circumstances,
and it is difficult to see the world as more complex than such an attitude
allows, to understand that individuals can neither be said to be entirely
responsible for their own fates nor entirely free from responsibility for
them. Under this analysis, it is crucial to recognize that where an individ-
ual's free will ends and the social, cultural, and environmental factors
acting upon him or her begins is an impossible and ultimately unproductive
See discussion infra Part III.
5 See discussion infra Part III.A.6 See discussion infra Part III.B.
7 See discussion infra Part III.C-D.
8 See discussion infra Part III.E.
9 See discussion infra Part IV.
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inquiry. Moreover, voluntarism is not the actual principle upon which cases
are decided, but merely a vehicle for expressing (or perhaps concealing) the
true basis for judicial decisions. For these reasons, it should be abandoned
as a means of substantiating decisions in Title VII cases.
I. WHAT IS VOLUNTARISM?
The concept of "voluntarism" is perhaps better characterized as a
family of scholarly dialogues that is known by many names and has several
members. Among them are "free will," "agency," "determinism," and
"moral responsibility." While there are philosophical distinctions between
the members of the family, this Article characterizes them as a cluster of
closely related ideas. The different labels represent the long history of
debate among academics in many disciplines as to whether human beings
are primarily active subjects that determine the courses of their own lives,
or whether they are primarily objects acted upon by social, cultural,
biological, or environmental forces beyond their control, and, in part based
upon the answer to this question, what responsibility they bear for their
actions-morally and legally. While there is no need to recapitulate that
debate here, this Article will sketch some of its broad outlines and offer a
few examples showing how the law, specifically the law of Title VII, has
taken a definite position in this debate--the wrong one in my view.
The problem of free will has occupied the minds and energies of
philosophers and theologians for many centuries. Professor Robert Kane
defines free will as "the power of agents to be the ultimate creators (or
originators) and sustainers oftheir own ends or purposes."'" While there are
many definitions of free will in the vast literature on the subject, this
characterization works as well as any for these purposes." Free will is an
ancient idea that has been under attack, especially since the seventeenth
century, by successive waves of determinist thought, which posit that "all
of our purposes and actions are determined or necessitated by factors
beyond the control of our wills."' 2 Such determinisms include the ancient
10 ROBERT KANE, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FREE WILL 4 (1996).
" For example, there is a contemporary trend toward differentiating between
the concept of "free will" and "free action" as some philosophers have dismissed
the idea of the will as a fiction. See id. at 3-4. This distinction, and others like it,
is too refined for the objectives to be accomplished here. The reader should be
aware, however, that this brief account of the concept ofvoluntarism does not even
touch upon many of the themes covered in the philosophical literature on the
subject.
121d. at5.
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idea of fate, the notion of universal laws of nature (scientific determinism),
the idea that our actions are the products of birth and upbringing (psycho-
logical determinism), theological determinism, and the laws of logic. 3 The
notion that human beings possess free will has been refuted, especially in
the twentieth century, because of its incompatibility with the image of
human beings generated by the social and natural sciences. 4
Moral responsibility is a related but distinct concept that takes the free
will/determinism debate one step further, asking why and when human
beings should be held responsible or blameworthy for their actions or
character traits. 5 This inquiry is often conflated with the free will/
determinism discussion, because those who posit that human behavior is
the result of free choices of individual human subjects. frequently use this
contention to support assignments of moral responsibility to individuals in
a variety of factual contexts. As a general matter, one who examines moral
responsibility asks who may be held morally blameworthy and why, and
then asks whether the morally blameworthy may also be held socially
and/or legally responsible for their actions.
Notions of responsibility, then, are integrally related to the free will/
determinism discussion. In fact, one can argue that "according to our
modem concept of moral responsibility, free will is no longer a mere condi-
tion of moral responsibility but its very source."' 6 Other commentators
suggest that the relationship between free will and moral responsibility
need not be so linear; in other words, even if some version or versions of
determinism is true, it does not necessarily mean that the social and legal
practices associated with moral responsibility must be abandoned.'7 But,
society must be aware of the fact that its notions of free will and its
judgments about responsibility are based upon "practical considerations
which are . . . themselves mediated by our own social and political
norms."'
18
Clearly, the concept of free will and its relationship to the practice of
assigning moral/social/legal blame are issues with which the law is, and
11Id. at 5-8.
14 Id. at5.
'5 See generally PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL RESPONSIBILrrY (John Martin Fischer
& Mark Ravizza eds., 1993) (collecting essays regarding issues of responsibility);
MARION SMILEY, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BOUNDARIES OF COMMUNITY
(1992) (examining judgments in blame-based cases, in part, on an individual's
social and political points of view).
16 SMILEY, supra note 15, at 82.
17 See Susan Wolf, The Importance of Free Will, in PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 15, at 101.
18 SMILEY, supra note 15, at 121.
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should be, concerned. The law, however, needs to be aware of competing
visions of the causes of human behavior and explicitly weigh the merits and
relevance thereof, rather than blindly incorporating social and political
norms. The dominant view on free will in our society (outside the academy,
at least) is fully accepting of the following analysis: individuals possess
free will; thus, their characters and behaviors in the vast majority of
instances are the result of the exercise of that agency; thus, individuals
should be held accountable for any harms that result from their actions.
This chain of reasoning is implicit in many areas of the law, which is
most often concerned with assigning blame and penalizing the blameworthy
accordingly. For example, one object of criminal law is to identify and
punish those who have violated laws with criminal penalties. Similarly, the
purpose of tort law is to hold financially responsible those who have in
some sense "caused" harm to others. To a large extent, these legal regimes
are premised upon notions of human agency and free choice-which hold
that the harms caused by the tortfeasor or criminal may fairly be traced
back to the free actions of that individual-and thus that the societal costs
of the harm may justly be visited upon her, whether by taking her money
or her freedom. In other words, much of our legal system is grounded in
what this Article refers to as the ideology of voluntarism.
The law often unthinkingly imports voluntarism--the dominant
analysis of agency and responsibility in our culture-into employment
discrimination law. 9 While notions of individual responsibility and
blameworthiness that comprise voluntarist rhetoric might be appropriate in
tort law and criminal law, they do not translate easily into anti-discrimina-
tion law discourse. In an anti-discrimination law context, the utilization of
such ideas serves only to stymie the realization of the purposes of the law
rather than to facilitate it. In the next section, this Article looks at Title VII
cases where voluntarist ideas were detrimental to the claims of plaintiffs
who otherwise might have obtained relief.
II. MAPPING THE TITLE VII CONTEXTS
IN WHICH VOLUNTARISM IS A CRITICAL FACTOR20
Previous commentators have addressed the distinction courts have
made in Title VII law between immutable and mutable traits, or status and
19 Of course, it is probably the case that this kind of thinking permeates most or
all areas of law, in part because it is so constitutive of some.
20 Intentionally, most of the cases that I cite in this section are well known-
many of them may be found in any employment discrimination textbook--and have
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conduct, to which it is sometimes referred." This Article's analysis, how-
ever, both draws from and builds on those works. For example, Professor
Peter Bayer concentrates on Title VII's negative assimilationist bias in
discussing the way in which courts have made a distinction between
immutable and mutable traits.2 2 His argument against making that distinc-
tion is to "protect[ ] the selfhood, personal integrity, and individual sen-
sibilities of employees."23 This Article takes this argument further by
positing that Title VII should be interpreted not simply to protect the liberty
already been subject to extensive academic commentary. I decided to use well-
known examples for a few reasons. First, because they have been so influential,
their impact on the shape of Title VII jurisprudence is undisputed; using a few
unknown cases from lower courts, on the other hand, might have called into
question the pervasiveness of the phenomenon I seek to illustrate. Second, I hope
familiarity with the cases will facilitate the ease with which the reader may make
the same connections I have made between the cases. Also, many of the cases I cite
are old, but this is because many of these areas of doctrine are so settled that cases
challenging them are no longer brought.
21 See Peter Brandon Bayer, Mutable Characteristics and the Definition of
Discrimination Under Title VII, 20 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 769 (1987) (discussing the
race and sex dress code cases as examples of mutable characteristics related to
those statuses that courts have nonetheless refused to protect); Karen Engle, The
Persistence ofNeutrality: The Failure of the Religious Accommodation Provision
to Redeem Title VI, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317 (1997). Engle discusses the racial
appearance cases, the sex-based dress and grooming cases, and the religious
accommodation cases together to show that outcomes and reasoning in the cases
are substantially similar. She also discusses that the religious accommodation
provision is not well suited to serve as a model for Title VII reform, and acknowl-
edges that the status-conduct distinction is firmly entrenched in Title VII
jurisprudence. Id. at 326.
' See Bayer, supra note 21. Professor Kenji Yoshino makes a related claim
about equal protection jurisprudence. See Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in
Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell", 108 YALE L.J. 485 (1998). Yoshino contends that equal protection
jurisprudence has an "assimilationist bias," meaning that because the law currently
privileges classifications that are presumed to be visible and immutable, groups
which might also merit heightened scrutiny, but whose defining characteristics can
be changed or concealed, are encouraged to assimilate by doing so. Id. at 490.
Yoshino's point is that it is illegitimate for the government to demand that
individuals assimilate in order to be protected from discrimination. Id. My
argument is that even if it were legitimate to encourage assimilation in this way, I
dispute the assumption that assimilation is a matter of meaningful choice as I define
it.
23 Bayer, supra note 21, at 881.
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of the individual employee but to allow workers, whose different life
experiences have to some extent determined their normative differences, to
enjoy equal employment opportunities. To make the claim that individual
liberty is the crucial factor here assumes that such liberty meaningfully
exists; this Article will argue that the agency of the individual worker is far
more constrained than the courts presume.
Similarly, Professor Karen Engle eloquently critiques the distinction
the courts have made between status and "volitional" conduct in the
workplace appearance cases, the language cases, and the religious
accommodation cases.24 The purpose of her article is to assess critically the
preoccupation of the courts with interpreting Title VII to mandate what
they perceive as neutrality.25 In so doing, she mentions that other scholars
have argued that the status-conduct distinction is flawed because "some
traits which seem mutable are either immutable or are not purely
mutable."26 But neither she nor any of the critics she cites ever fully
engages the question of what it might mean for a trait to be not purely
mutable or why the courts might have chosen this particular vehicle for
justifying their decisions.
Finally, this Article's analysis goes beyond existing commentary on
this subject because it covers a broader range of Title VII contexts than has
been previously examined. Currently, no commentator has considered the
possible relevance of this inquiry to cases in which defendants raise the
lack of interest argument, sexual harassment cases, or cases involving arrest
24See Engle, supra note 21.
25Engle argues that in race cases, the courts take an "integrationist" approach
(no different treatment), whereas in sex cases they take a "separationist" approach
(disparate treatment allowed as long as it equally burdens both sexes). Id. at
327-55. The main objective of Engle's article is to answer commentators who have
suggested that the approach to race and sex in Title VII cases should be more like
the approach to religion (i.e., accommodation). Engle studies the religion cases and
reveals that despite the religious accommodation provision in Title VII, courts have
been unable to move beyond integrationist and separationist (or, what they perceive
as "neutral") frameworks. Id. at 406-08.
26 Id. at 354 (citing BILL PIATr, LANGUAGE ON THE JOB: BALANCING BUSINESS
NEEDS AND EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 121 (1993)) (arguing that acquiring one's native
language entails immutable neurophysiological changes); see also Paulette
Caldwell, A HairPiece: Perspectives on the Intersection ofRace and Gender, 1991
DUKE L.J. 365, 383 ("[H]air has both mutable and immutable characteristics.");
Michael F. Patterson, Note, Garcia v. Spun Steak Company: English-Only Rules
in the Workplace, 27 AIZ. ST. L.J. 277, 293 (1995) (arguing that language is
"practically immutable")).
2003-2004]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
and conviction records. Some commentators have examined one context,
such as English-only policies, in isolation, and have come to somewhat
similar conclusions about that particular context.2" Still, this Article does
not comprehensively cover every Title VII context in which voluntarist
rhetoric has been employed. Rather, it seeks to heighten awareness about
the use of such rhetoric across many different Title VII contexts.
A. Sex/Gender
1. The Lack of Interest Argument
It seems beyond dispute that job segregation on the basis of race and
sex was the principal phenomenon that Title VII was intended to amelio-
rate.28 Unfortunately, at the dawn of the twenty-first century, a majority of
Americans still labor in workplaces segregated by race, sex, or both. Part
of the explanation for Title VI's failure to desegregate work in the United
States is that suits brought under the statute, challenging job segregation,
have often been decided in favor of employers, who claim that individual
workers are responsible for segregated workforces instead of themselves.2 9
Professor Vicki Schultz has documented compellingly the force and
prevalence of the so-called "lack of interest" argument--the contention that
employers bear no responsibility for sex or race segregation in the
workplace because women or persons of color were not interested in
applying for the (usually more highly rewarded) jobs in which they are
underrepresented or absent-in Title VII cases.30 Of the sex-discrimination
27 On language discrimination, see, for example, Stephen M. Cutler, Note, A
Trait-Based Approach to National Origin Claims Under Title VII, 94 YALE L.J.
1164 (1985); Steven I. Locke, Language Discrimination and English-Only Rules
in the Workplace: The Case for Legislative Amendment of Title VII, 27 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 33 (1996); Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating "National
Origin " Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805 (1994) On
dress and grooming in the context of sex, see infra note 37. On dress and grooming
in the context of race, see Caldwell, supra note 26.
28 See Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An
Empirical Study of the Lack ofInterest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job
Segregation, 59 U. CHt. L. REV. 1073, 1074-75 (1992).
29 See, e.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill.
1986), aff'd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
30 See Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial
Interpretations of Sex Segregation In the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the
Lack ofInterest Argument, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1749 (1990); see also Schultz &
Petterson, supra note 28.
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cases Schultz documents, the most well-known is EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., in which the EEOC argued that Sears had discriminated against
women in its hiring practices for commission sales jobs, which were filled
overwhelmingly by men, relegating women to lower-paying noncommis-
sion sales positions.3' The court accepted Sears' argument that the striking
disparities in the percentage of women applicants for sales positions
generally and the percentage of women in commission sales jobs32 resulted
from women's own, pre-existing employment preferences, not from
discrimination.33 In so doing, the court countenanced explanations for
women's alleged lack of interest in commission sales jobs that were
premised upon stereotypes about women workers' supposed aversion to
competition and risk and their preference for a "softer," more nurturing
working environment. 4
Sears is just one example of a sex discrimination case in which a court
has accepted the lack of interest argument; it was neither a new nor isolated
phenomenon in 1986 when the case was decided.35 In fact, Schultz and
Petterson's data shows that between 1967 and 1989, defendants who
asserted the lack of interest defense in sex discrimination cases prevailed
over forty percent of the time. 36 The ascription of workplace sex segrega-
tion to women's lack of interest in more highly-paid work represents a
particularly pernicious version of voluntarist ideology.
2. Workplace Appearance
Another context in which notions of personal choice have figured into
Title VII judicial decision-making is that of employer dress and grooming
codes that discriminate on the basis of sex.37 Many of these cases have been
31 Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1278.
32 According to statistics compiled by the EEOC, women represented sixty-one
percent of applicants for full-time sales positions from 1973 to 1980 but made up
only twenty-seven percent of commission salespersons, whereas seventy-five
percent of noncommission sales jobs in the same period went to women. Schultz,
supra note 30, at 1752 (quoting Brief for the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission as Appellant at 7, EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302 (7th
Cir. 1988) (Nos. 86-1519 and 86-162 1)).
33 Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1315.
34Id. at 1307.
35 See Schultz, supra note 30, at 1776-99.
36 Schultz & Petterson, supra note 28, at 1097.
371 am far from the first person to discuss the cases cited in this Article and to
criticize their outcomes. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes:
Dress and Appearance Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality,
2003-2004)
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brought by men with long hair challenging employer grooming policies
requiring men, but not women, to keep their hair short.38 Perhaps the most-
cited of these is Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co., in which
the Fifth Circuit found that such a policy did not violate Title VII's
prohibition of sex discrimination.39 Because these policies facially treat
men and women differently, judges in these early cases had to be creative
to find that differential hair-length policies did not fall within Title VII's
purview. The hair length cases were brought using the so-called "sex-plus"
theory, in which the employee is discriminated against on the basis of her
sex plus some purportedly neutral characteristic. Conveniently enough for
the Fifth Circuit in Willingham, the two leading cases of sex-plus discrimi-
nation at the time concerned employer policies prohibiting female
employees being married4" and having young children. 1 So the court
created out of whole cloth the following interpretation of the sex-plus
doctrine, eliminating most employer liability for sex discrimination on the
basis of disparate dress and grooming policies:
[A] line must be drawn between distinctions grounded on such fundamen-
tal rights as the right to have children or to marry and those interfering
with the manner in which an employer exercises his [sic] judgment as to
the way to operate a business. Hair length is not immutable and in the
situation of employer vis-A-vis employee enjoys no constitutional
92 MICH. L. REV. 2541 (1994); Bayer, supra note 21, at 841-80; Mary Anne C.
Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate
Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 60-69 (1995);
Engle, supra note 21, at 340-53; Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex
Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 75-80 (1995); Karl E. Klare, Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appear-
ance, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1395 (1992).
3 See, e.g., Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1977); Earwood
v. Cont'l S.E. Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1976); Longo v. Carlisle
DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1976); Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 527
F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1975); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084
(5th Cir. 1975); Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974); Dodge
v. Giant Foods, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
39 See Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1084.
4 See Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971)
(invalidating airline policy requiring female flight attendants to remain unmarried).
41 See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (holding that
disparate treatment with respect to a subclass of one sex can violate Title VII in the
context of an employer policy of refusing to hire female employees who had small
children).
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protection. If the employee objects to the grooming code, he [sic] has the
right to reject it by looking elsewhere for employment, or alternatively, he
[sic] may choose to subordinate his [sic] preference by accepting the code
along with the job.
We adopt the view, therefore, that distinctions in employment
practices between men and women on the basis of something other than
immutable or protected characteristics do not inhibit employment
opportunities in violation of [Title VII].
42
Clearly, voluntarist ideas animated the Willingham court's reasoning. Two
main justifications are being offered here, consistent with the reasoning
offered in other "haircut" cases. First, the courts reason that Congress'
intent was to afford equal employment opportunities for women relative to
those available to men. 3 They cannot seem to conceive of any way in
which protecting male employees with long hair could possibly effectuate
that goal. Second, the policies complained of are trivialized by the courts
as having a de minimis effect on the plaintiffs precisely because hair length
is not an immutable characteristic. 44 From the courts' perspective, it is a
minimal intrusion upon the employee's personal autonomy to get a simple
haircut (the implicit premise being that men should have short hair
anyway). Further, the courts perceive the plaintiffs' employment with the
companies whose policies are complained of as itself a product of their own
choices.45 The courts imply that if a man wants to wear his hair long, he can
simply find another job. If he chooses to work for a company, that choice
implies, or indeed demands, his compliance with the company's dress code.
The early decisions of the appellate courts in the "haircut" cases have
been followed in other dress and grooming code cases, such that, with very
few exceptions, an employer may impose different standards upon men and
women workers without risking any Title VII liability.46 Cases have
42 Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1091-92.
43 See id. at 1091; see also Austin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d
1254, 1256 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
44 See Bayer, supra note 21, at 853-60 (arguing that modes of dress are integral
to an individual's sense of identity).
41 See, e.g., Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1091; Fagan v. Nat'l Cash Register Co.,
481 F.2d 1115, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
4 There are two notable exceptions to this rule. First, some courts have ruled
that requiring women but not men to wear uniforms violates Title VII. See, e.g.,
O'Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, 656 F. Supp. 263,266-67 (S.D.
Ohio 1987) (holding that requiring female but not male sales clerks to wear a
2003-2004]
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involved policies such as requiring men, but not women, to wear a tie' and
requiring women to wear makeup.48 In many of the cases, courts have found
against the plaintiffs and have often downplayed the seriousness of the
claims by characterizing them as trivial and unrelated to equal employment
opportunity.
For example, in Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain, the district court held
that a company policy prohibiting women from wearing slacks to work did
not violate Title VII, relying on the "haircut" cases to support its decision.49
In response to the plaintiff's argument that the haircut cases were distin-
guishable and that her claim fell within the sex-plus doctrine, the court
identified three kinds of characteristics that may give rise to a valid sex-
plus claim: "(1) immutable characteristics, (2) characteristics which are
changeable but which involve fundamental rights (such as having children
or getting married), and (3) characteristics which are changeable but which
significantly affect employment opportunities afforded to one sex."50
Dripping with disdain, the court rejected Lanigan's sex-plus claim:
Plaintiff does not contend that she is unable to wear clothes other than
pantsuits or that she is in any way physically unable to comply with the
dress code. In other words, [her] affection for pantsuits is not an
"immutable characteristic." Plaintiff does not contend that she has a
"fundamental right" to wear pantsuits to work. Plaintiff does contend that
smock perpetuated sex stereotypes in violation of Title VII); Carroll v. Talman Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1033 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that employer
dress policy that required female employees to wear color-coordinated skirts or
slacks and a jacket, tunic, or vest, where male employees were only directed to
wear proper business attire, violated Title VII). Second, in some cases, requiring
only women to wear sexually provocative attire has been held to discriminate on
the basis of sex. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 611
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that revealing lobby attendant uniforms violate Title
VII); Marentette v. Mich. Host, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 909, 912 (E.D. Mich. 1980)
(holding that sexually provocative waitress uniforms may violate Title VII).
47See Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1977).
See, e.g., Tamimi v. Howard Johnson Co., Inc., 807 F.2d 1550 (1 1th Cir.
1987) (holding that female employee allegedly fired for refusing to wear makeup
was discriminated against on the basis of sex, but only because the makeup policy
was created as a pretext to terminate her in relation to skin problems associated
with pregnancy, and refusing to rle on the question of whether the make-up policy
itself violated Title VII).
49 Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388, 1392 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
50Id. at 1391.
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the dress code significantly affects employment opportunities because it
perpetuates "a sexist, chauvinistic attitude in employment."
•.. The decision to project a certain image as one aspect of a com-
pany policy is the employer's prerogative which employees may accept or
reject. If they choose to reject the policy, they are subject to such
sanctions as deemed appropriate by the company. An employer is simply
not required to account for personal preferences with respect to dress and
grooming standards. In this case, plaintiff has not demonstrated how
defendant's dress code policies impermissibly restrict equal employment
opportunities and her contention that the policies perpetuate a stereotype
is simply a matter of opinion.
51
Once again, voluntarist rhetoric is at work here. The Lanigan court
conceptualized the claim of the female employee fired for wearing pantsuits
to work as concerning the exercise of individual fashion preferences and
choices rather than acknowledging the real issue: the enforced differentia-
tion between men and women workers that reinforces the image of men as
ideal, competent workers and the image of women as inauthentic, inferior
workers.
3. Transsexualism
Another claim of sex discrimination that courts have rejected due to
voluntarist beliefs is that of the transsexual. In Holloway v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., the Ninth Circuit rejected plaintiff Ramona (formerly
Robert) Holloway's sex discrimination claim using some of the same
reasoning articulated in the dress code cases.52 In particular, the court
reasoned that Title VII was intended to remedy the lack of equal employ-
ment opportunities afforded to women,53 and because transsexualism is not
an immutable trait, but a choice made by an individual, Title VII is not
applicable.' The court asserted that "Holloway has not claimed to have
[been] treated discriminatorily because she is male or female, but rather
"' Id. at 1391-92.
32 See Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977).
13 See id. at 662 ("[T]he clear intent of the 1972 legislation was to remedy the
economic deprivation of women as a class. The cases interpreting Title VII sex
discrimination provisions agree that they were intended to place women on an
equal footing with men.").
54 Id. at 664.
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because she is a transsexual who chose to change her sex .... A transsex-
ual individual's decision to undergo sex change surgery does not bring that
individual, nor transsexuals as a class, within the scope of Title VII.""
Under this analysis, even if transsexualism is itself an immutable character-
istic (a possibility that the Holloway court seemed to reject), it is the choice
of the transsexual individual to undergo the sex-conversion process, which
is the key reason that the employer may not be held liable.
Similarly, in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., the Seventh Circuit
emphasized that Ulane, a male-to-female transsexual, was not discriminated
against as a woman, but as a transsexual--"a biological male who takes
female hormones, cross-dresses, and has surgically altered parts of her body
to make it appear to be female."56 The court clearly did not accept the
contention that transsexualism is an authentic disorder, describing it as
"discontent with the sex into which [one was] born."57 This viewpoint
surely had an impact upon its decision. The corollary to this disbelief in the
authenticity of transsexualism, however, is the unquestioning acceptance
of the idea that plaintiffs, like Ulane and Holloway, exercise a free choice
to alter their bodies in a way that their employers find unacceptable, and
when they exercise that choice, they should be prepared to accept the
consequences.
58
4. Sexual Orientation
In DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., the Ninth Circuit
held that homosexuality did not fall under the Title VII prohibition on sex
55 Id.
56 Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984).
17 See id. at 1085.
58 A related argument may be seen in the more recent case of Oiler v. Winn-
Dixie Louisiana, Inc., No. CIV.A.00-3114,2002 WL 31098541 (E.D. La. Sept. 16,
2002), in which the court held that the plaintiff, a self-identified heterosexual who
was terminated for cross-dressing during non-working hours, did not state a
cognizable Title VII claim for sex discrimination under the sex-stereotyping theory.
He was terminated because he "wears women's clothing, shoes, underwear, breast
prostheses, wigs, make-up, and nail polish, pretends to be a woman, and publicly
identifies himself as a woman named 'Donna.' "Id. at *5. Notably, the court cited
both Holloway and Ulane in its opinion. The implication of the court's rationale
for its holding is that if Oiler had simply possessed effeminate traits that he
possibly could not control, he might have been protected by Title VII from
discrimination, but because he chose to act upon his compulsion to cross-dress, he
was excluded from Title VII's protection. See id.
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discrimination. 9 The court stated that sex discrimination applies only to
discrimination on the basis of gender, and "should not be judicially
extended to include sexual preference such as homosexuality."" The phrase
"sexual preference" itself reveals a reliance upon voluntarist principles;
thus, it has been rejected in recent years in favor of the phrase "sexual
orientation," implying that the individual does not freely choose the sex of
the person to which she is attracted. There are no other direct references in
the DeSantis opinion to an understanding of "homosexuality" as a volun-
tary characteristic. At the time DeSantis was decided, however, same-sex
sexual orientation was popularly understood to be volitional (as many
people still believe).
TheDeSantis court also relied heavily upon Congress' refusal to extend
Title VII protection to "homosexuals" on the basis of sexual orientation.6
Because this reliance makes little sense standing alone (since the plaintiffs'
claims were all based upon sex, not sexual orientation),62 it must be looked
at in the context of the entire opinion, as well as the opinions it
cites--namely, Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.63 and Holloway v.
Arthur Andersen & Co.' As argued elsewhere, the workplace appearance
cases, transsexual cases, and "homosexual" cases all combine to preserve
the gender status quo.6" More importantly for these purposes, however, they
all do so by appealing, sometimes quite subtly, to notions of voluntarism.
'9 DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 333 (9th Cir. 1979).
60 Id. at 329--30.
61 Id. at 329.
62 The DeSantis plaintiffs used five strategies: straight disparate treatment
(meaning that homosexuality falls within the meaning of sex in Title VII); disparate
impact (claiming that anti-gay employment policies disproportionately affected
male workers, who were more likely to be "homosexual" or more likely to be
discovered); different employment criteria (that is, men who prefer men are treated
differently from women who prefer men); interference with association (based
upon EEOC decisions holding that discrimination against an employee on the basis
of the race of her friends was race discrimination); and, for one of the plaintiffs, a
sex-stereotyping disparate treatment claim (based upon the fact that he was fired
for wearing an earring). Id. at 329-32.
6 Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that
Title VII was not violated by an employer's refusal to hire an applicant because he
believed the applicant was effeminate).
' Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977).
65See Sandi Farrell, Reconsidering the Gender-Equality Perspectivefor Under-
standing LGBT Rights, 13 L. & SEXUALITY (forthcoming 2004) (suggesting that
such cases reflect the way judges deal with gender non-conformity).
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5. Sexual Harassment
In the context of sexual harassment, the ideology of voluntarism may
be most clearly seen in the requirement that the harassment be "unwel-
come." The textbook case of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson is
instructive.66 Meritor Savings Bank involved a female bank teller who was
propositioned by her lecherous supervisor and, in fear of losing her job,
submitted to his advances for a period of about three years.67 Vinson was
subsequently discharged for excessive use of sick leave and sued the bank
for the sexual harassment she had been subjected to during her employ-
ment. In affirming the appellate court, the Supreme Court elaborated on the
"unwelcomeness" requirement.68 The district court had found that the
sexual relationship between Vinson and her supervisor was voluntary and
thus that there was no cognizable Title VII claim.69 The Court clarified its
perceived distinction between voluntariness and unwelcomeness:
[T]he fact that sex-related conduct was "voluntary," in the sense that the
complainant was not forced to participate against her will, is not a defense
to a sexual harassment suit .... The gravamen of any sexual harassment
claim is that the alleged sexual advances were "unwelcome."
* * .[But] [w]hile "voluntariness" in the sense of consent is not a
defense to such a claim, it does not follow that a complainant's sexually
provocative speech or dress is irrelevant as a matter of law in determining
whether he or she found particular sexual advances unwelcome. To the
contrary, such evidence is obviously relevant.70
Many commentators have rightly criticized the unwelcomeness requirement
and the admissibility of evidence of plaintiffs' speech and dress. 71 Despite
" Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
67 Id. at 60.
' Id. at 68-69; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985) (establishing the
"unwelcomeness" requirement).
69 See Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37 (D.D.C. 1980),
rev'd, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'dsubnom. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 (1986).
70 Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 68-69.
71 See, e.g., Christina A. Bull, Comment, The Implications of Admitting Evi-
dence of a Sexual Harassment Plaintiff's Speech and Dress in the Aftermath of
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 41 UCLA L. REV. 117 (1993); Ann C. Juliano,
Note, Did She Askfor It?: The "Unwelcome" Requirement in Sexual Harassment
Cases, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1558 (1992).
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the Court's "generous" refusal to hold Vinson blameworthy for not having
rebuffed her supervisor's advances, as had the district court, its character-
ization of the unwelcomeness requirement delineated a regime in which
only victims who conformed to the most circumspect standards of dress and
behavior could hope to gain relief. As in rape cases, the sexualized victim
is not an authentic victim in this view. The "voluntary" choice to talk or
dress provocatively (itself a problematic word, placing the blame on the
speaker or wearer rather than the listener or observer) can undermine or
destroy a sexual harassment victim's case, regardless of its merits.
B. Race/National Origin
1. The Lack of Interest Argument
As in sex-based cases challenging job segregation, employers have
defended against such claims by offering the lack of interest argument.72
Perhaps the most pointed example of judicial acceptance of such an
argument came in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio. 3 The Supreme Court
found against the plaintiffs in Wards Cove74 in a disparate impact case
involving a cannery in Alaska that was highly segregated by race-the
noncannery jobs were filled mostly by white mainlanders and the lower-
paying, lower-status cannery positions were occupied mostly by native
Alaskans and other workers of color.75 In rejecting the plaintiffs' disparate
impact claim, the Court emphasized both the interest and qualifications of
the cannery workers in noncannery jobs.76
First, according to the Court, the proportion of cannery workers who
were nonwhite was not an appropriate figure to compare to the racial
composition of the noncannery workforce because the cannery workers
were not qualified for some of the noncannery jobs. Thus, the Court
reasoned, "[i]f the absence of minorities holding such skilled positions is
72 See Schultz & Petterson, supra note 28, at 1077.
73 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
71 am greatly indebted to Professor Vicki Schultz for highlighting this aspect
of Wards Cove in her Employment Discrimination course.
71 Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 650. In addition to the actual job segregation, the
workers were housed and fed in separate facilities, leading Justice Stevens to liken
the cannery to a plantation economy in his dissent. See id. at 663 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Thankfully, the Wards Cove decision aroused so much controversy that
Congress explicitly overruled portions of the opinion in 1991. Civil Rights Act of
1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991).
76 Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 651-54.
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due to a dearth of qualified nonwhite applicants (for reasons that are not
[the cannery's] fault), [its] selection methods or employment practices
cannot be said to have had a 'disparate impact' on nonwhites."" This is an
indirect appeal to voluntarist ideas. The Court's unstated implication is that
because the cannery is not at fault for the lack of qualified nonwhite
applicants, it must be the nonwhite cannery workers, or nonwhites in
general, who are to blame for their own lack of qualifications.
Next, the Court addressed the lack of interest argument directly, stating
that characterizing the cannery workers as the potential labor pool, even for
the unskilled noncannery positions for which they arguably were qualified,
was flawed. The reason, the Court argues, is that "the vast majority of these
cannery workers did not seek jobs in unskilled noncannery positions; [and]
there is no showing that many of them would have done so even if none of
the [employment] practices existed.""8 The reasonable inference here is that
the Court believed that the cannery workers spent their days surrounded by
smelly salmon guts because they chose to do so. By accepting the lack of
interest argument, the Court implicitly blames the cannery workers who
were challenging the job segregation at the cannery for the very existence
of that job segregation.
2. Workplace Appearance
Also paralleling the context of sex, racially discriminatory dress and
grooming policies have generally survived Title VII challenges. Here,
though, the policies are not facially discriminatory in the sense that they
dictate different standards for different races. Rather, they discriminate by
affecting one race disproportionately, although they are often upheld
because that fact is difficult to prove. Perhaps the most well-known
example of such a case is Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc., in which the
employer's policy prohibiting the wearing of all-braided hairstyles by some
classes of employees was found not to discriminate on the basis of race or
sex.7 9 Among the court's justifications for ruling against the plaintiff was
an appeal to notions of voluntarism. As Professor Paulette Caldwell
explains:
77 Id. at 651-52 (footnote omitted).
78 Id. at 653-54.
79 Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). For an
excellent discussion oftheRogers case and related issues, see Caldwell, supra note
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The court conceived of race and the legal protection against racism almost
exclusively in biological terms. Natural hairstyles-or at least some of
them, such as Afros-are permitted because hair texture is immutable, a
matter over which individuals have no choice. Braids, however, are the
products of artifice-a cultural practice-and are therefore mutable, i.e.,
the result of choice. Because the plaintiff could have altered the all-
braided hairstyle in the exercise of her own volition, American [Airlines]
was legally authorized to force that choice upon her.80
Another, more recent example of a racially discriminatory grooming
policy upheld implicitly referencing choice is Santee v. Windsor Court
Hotel L.P.81 In Santee, the plaintiff, an African-American woman, was
denied a job as a housekeeper in the defendant's hotel because her hair was
dyed blonde, allegedly in contravention of the hotel's policy prohibiting
employees "from having extremes in hair color."82 As is typical in so-called
"grooming" cases, the court found that the plaintiff s "claim is based on her
hair color, not her race .... An employer's grooming code constitutes
discrimination based on grooming standards; consequently, such a code lies
outside the realm of the Civil Rights Act. 8 3
What the Santee court failed to recognize is that by typical standards,
blonde is not an extreme hair color. It was only perceived as extreme by the
hotel because Santee was African-American rather than white, and thus her
hair color was not "natural." This despite the fact that countless other
naturally brunette women dye their hair blonde with impunity, and
presumably would not be denied a job by the hotel for having an "extreme"
hair color. The unstated premise upon which the court relies is that because
Santee had chosen to dye her hair blonde, a privilege apparently available
only to white women' and then chose not to alter her blonde hair at the
request of her interviewer," she also chose to forfeit ajob opportunity. This
80Caldwell, supra note 26, at 378-79 (footnote omitted).
s' Santee v. Windsor Court Hotel L.P., No. CIV.A.99-3891, 2000 WL 1610775
(E.D. La. Oct. 26, 2000).
82 Id. at *1.
83 Id. at *3.
' Because the "hiring policy ... makes distinctions based on the employer's
subjective determination of what constitutes an 'extreme' hair color" and because
"it is not the role of [the] court to decide what is and is not 'extreme' under the
[employer's] grooming policy," it is unclear whether a Latino or Asian-American
woman with blonde hair would be in violation of the policy. Id. at *3-*4.
51 Id. at *1.
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premise is alluded to when the court notes that "[e]mployers are only
prohibited from discriminating against employees on the basis of immuta-
ble characteristics such as race and national origin."86 Once again, the
language of voluntarism is utilized to deny Title VII relief to a plaintiff
with an otherwise meritorious claim.
3. English-Only Rules
Another much-discussed context in which courts have relied upon
notions of agency to justify denying plaintiffs' proposed relief is in the
national origin context of language discrimination, specifically in cases in
which employers demand that bilingual employees speak only English in
the workplace. 7 The leading case in this area is Garcia v. Gloor, in which
the Fifth Circuit held that such a policy did not violate Title VII's
prohibition of discrimination based upon national origin. According to the
court, the policy did not implicate Title VII because it discriminated on the
basis of Garcia's "preferred" language, not on the basis of national origin. 9
Predictably, it was the allegedly elective nature of Garcia's insubordination
that seemed to most move the court to reject his national origin discrimina-
tion claim.
One could argue that it was not only the voluntariness of Garcia
speaking Spanish that doomed his employment discrimination claim.
Instead, lurking in the background of the analysis of the national origin
claim were the employer's contentions that Garcia was an all-around
inferior employee who deserved to be terminated because he was lazy and
defiant.9" It is likely that this backdrop had at least some effect on the
enthusiasm with which the court found in the employer's favor and the zeal
with which it emphasized the role of Garcia's choices in his own termina-
tion.
86Id. at *3.
87 For academic commentary on this issue, see supra note 27. In addition, in
Professor Vicki Schultz's course lectures in Employment Discrimination, she
pointedly criticized the English-only cases for relying on notions of choice, for
which I credit my recognition of the centrality of voluntarism to the decisions.
88 Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980).
9 Id. at 268.
90 Id. at 266-67 (noting that the employer testified that "Mr. Garcia's discharge
was for a combination of deficiencies [such as] failure to keep his inventory
current, failure to replenish the stock on display from stored merchandise, failure
to keep his area clean and failure to respond to numerous reprimands as well as for
violation of the English-only rule").
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The Gloor opinion is remarkable in its use of voluntarist rhetoric. The
words "choice," "choose," "chose," "preference," "prefer," and "preferred"
are used no less than nineteen times in the portion of the opinion dealing
with the substance of the national origin claim.9 Interestingly, the Gloor
court relied heavily on the Willingham hair-length opinion,92 indicating that
it construed Garcia's claim as "national origin-plus" so that it could place
the same restrictions on the kinds of traits that could be the basis of such a
claim as were created for the sex-plus cases.93 Thus, the court itself
explicitly tied the two kinds of cases together based on their key shared
characteristic--that the plaintiffs could not recover for discrimination
based upon a supposedly voluntary trait or behavior.
The other "textbook" case concerning English-only rules is Garcia v.
Spun Steak Co., in which the Ninth Circuit followed the Gloor decision in
refusing to invalidate an employer's English-only policy.94 The interesting
thing about Spun Steak, for these purposes, is the facts of the case and how
they might have influenced the court's decision. In Gloor, the background
facts revealed an employer bent on ridding itself of a perceived problem
employee, whereas Spun Steak concerned an employer attempting to deal
with the harassment of non-Spanish-speaking employees by the Spanish-
speaking plaintiffs.95 Thus, Spun Steak provides another example of a case
in which plaintiffs' voluntary behavior--besides that which is being
contested--arguably had some effect on the willingness of the court to find
in their favor. The court in Spun Steak could not perceive the plaintiffs as
victims of national origin discrimination when evidence indicated that they
themselves had engaged in race discrimination against their co-workers. Of
course, Spun Steak did not address a question of first impression as did
Gloor; however, Spun Steak was seemingly a reversal of a previous Ninth
Circuit ruling that an English-only rule did violate Title VII.96
911d. at 268-71.
92 See discussion infra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
93 See Gloor, 618 F.2d at 269 (asserting that "[s]ave for religion, the discrimina-
tions on which the Act focuses its laser of prohibition are those that are either
beyond the victim's power to alter,... or that impose a burden on an employee on
one of the prohibited bases" (internal quotation omitted)).
94 Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1487 (9th Cir. 1993).
95 Id. at 1483 (noting that the English-only policy was adopted after manage-
ment had received complaints that the plaintiffs had "made derogatory, racist
comments in Spanish about two co-workers, one of whom is African-American and
the other Chinese-American").96 See Gutierrez v. Mun. Court, 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot,
490 U.S. 1016 (1989). Of course, the Spun Steak court conveniently diminished the
relevance of the Gutierrez holding because it was vacated. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d
at 1487 n.l.
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C. Religion
The case of religion offers an interesting lens through which to view
the sex, race, and national origin cases discussed above. Because religion
is regarded as a mutable characteristic that is nevertheless protected, some
commentators have suggested that the accommodation approach to religion
be imported into contexts such as race and national origin. 7 Professor
Karen Engle points out that such suggestions erroneously assume that
religion is treated differently from race, sex, and national origin in Title VII
jurisprudence.98
In the early Title VII religion cases, Engle argues, courts drew the same
distinction between volitional conduct and status as had been drawn in the
race and sex cases. Then in 1972 Congress amended Title VII to protect
religious observance as well as belief, which was supposed to eliminate the
status-conduct distinction with respect to religion.99 From 1972 to 1980,
much of the litigation centered around the definition of religion, until the
EEOC issued guidelines defining religion in 1980.'00 Since then, the main
question that courts examine is whether making the accommodation for the
religious employee would cause an undue burden on the employer.
Despite the introduction of an accommodationist standard for religion,
Engle argues, the outcomes in religion cases have been similar to those in
race and sex cases involving the status-conduct distinction."'0 One reason
for this, she contends, is that courts have a hard time swallowing the notion
"' See, e.g., PIATr, supra note 26, at 116 (citing religion as an example of a
protected mutable characteristic that, like culture, is formative of the individual's
world view); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind", 44
STAN. L. REV. 1, 65 (1991) (calling for a religion-type approach to race in
constitutional jurisprudence that would recognize the exercise of race-culture as a
fundamental right); Perea, supra note 27, at 866-67 (arguing that ethnicity should
be treated like religion in that mutability is irrelevant because religion goes to the
heart of individual identity).
98 Engle, supra note 21, at 357-407 (discussing the history of judicial
interpretations of religion under Title VII and concluding that religion cases have
not been treated significantly differently).
' Id. at 354. Interestingly, between 1972 and 1980 (when the EEOC issued a
broad definition of religion), the courts often recognized another type ofvoluntarist
idea in attempting to define religion under Title VII--that beliefs and observances
that were directed by a church were protected, and those which were not, were not
protected because they were characterized as a matter of personal preference and
not beyond the individual's control. Id. at 373-74.
'0o See id. at 372-87.
"' Id. at 360.
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that they should force employers to treat some employees differently from
others under an antidiscrimination statute. 2 Another is that the religion
cases, like the race and sex cases, involve judicial balancing of the interests
of employees versus employers, and courts are generally reticent to place
much of a burden on employers. 3
As discussed above, the religion cases progressed through three distinct
periods. During the first two, notions of individual agency and choice were
utilized to deny relief to plaintiffs. Before 1972, the trend was to consider
belief an unchangeable status (or a status which an employer could not
require an employee to change) and observance as a matter of individual
choice. From 1972 to 1980, observances compelled by an institutionalized
religion were deemed protected, while those that were based on personal
conviction were often regarded as merely personal preferences and thus,
unprotected. After 1980, the courts have not been as able to employ
voluntarist ideas in finding for employers because they have focused on the
hardship that accommodation causes the employer rather than the effect on
the employee of whether she is accommodated.
The trajectory of the religious discrimination claim toward the question
of undue burden and reasonable accommodation was facilitated and influ-
enced by the only two Supreme Court cases addressing Title VII religion
claims: Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison1" and Ansonia Board of
Education v. Philbrook.°5 These cases also emphasize the differences in
how religion is treated compared to race, sex and national origin. Both
cases involved members of the Worldwide Church of God who came into
conflict with their employers over the issue of not working on certain days
because of their religious beliefs. In Hardison, the plaintiff was discharged
because he refused to work Saturdays; 0 6 in Philbrook, the plaintiff claimed
that the local school board's policy of allowing three days leave for
religious observance but not allowing employees to use sick leave or
personal leave for additional holy days violated Title VII. 10 7 In both cases,
the Court found in favor of the employers and addressed the issues of
undue hardship and reasonable accommodation, respectively. The holding
in Hardison, essentially, amounted to the idea that any cost to an employer
in accommodating an employee's religion that is more than de minimis is
102 See id. at 360-61.
'03 See id. at 361.
'04Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
105 Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986).
'o6Hardison, 432 U.S. at 69.
107 Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 65.
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an undue burden."0 8 In Philbrook, the Court held that an employer's
obligation under § 7010) is met when it offers the employee a reasonable
accommodation, whether or not that accommodation is acceptable to the
employee' 9
Thus, despite the difference in focus between the religion cases and the
other Title VII contexts, the outcomes have remained the same-plaintiffs
rarely win, and when they do, it is usually because the employer did not
even attempt to accommodate their religious needs."0 One similarity
between these outcomes is that employers are only rarely subject to Title
VII liability, usually in cases of egregious discrimination. But, lurking
behind the outcomes of the religion cases is a perception that observing a
holy day is a personal choice, that it is not compelled in any meaningful
way, and that in the grand scheme of things, it is far too unimportant to
really amount to legally remediable discrimination. Religion, then, is a
context in which voluntarist ideas have been officially rejected but covertly
remain relevant. This weighs in favor of the need to openly recognize and
challenge voluntarism in employment discrimination law as a whole, lest
it infect even those contexts in which it has been formally decreed
irrelevant.
D. Disparate Impact and the Case ofArrest and Conviction Records
The disparate impact cause of action may be said to implicitly endorse
the belief that not all discrimination can be explained by reference to
notions of individual bias against a group visited upon one member or all
members of that group. "Disparate impact" often means that the discrimina-
tion at issue is not intentional but rather that the employment criteria
complained of operates to freeze in place the existing social structure and
allocation of resources. Indeed, intent is never at issue in disparate impact
cases, even where courts may suspect that it exists."'
0' Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84.
'09 Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 68-69.
Io See, e.g., EEOC v. Ithaca Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 116, 118 (4th Cir. 1988)
(holding that employer's failure to attempt to accommodate employee's religiously-
based need not to work on Sunday violated Title VII); see also Engle, supra note
21, at 388.
"' There has been a recent increase in scholarship about the relationship
between intent and discrimination, based on social science research suggesting that
most discrimination is indeed unintentional. One of the early and stellar works on
unconscious discrimination was written by critical race theorist Charles Lawrence.
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Intent, in this analysis, bears an important relationship to the notions of
voluntarism critiqued in this Article. One can argue that intent to discrimi-
nate is necessary to place moral blame---an idea that seems to increasingly
animate the courts' response to disparate impact suits. When an employer
is sued for discrimination with a disparate impact claim, by definition that
employer cannot be held morally culpable by the court for that discrimina-
tion, but it can be held legally culpable. The need to find moral fault
somewhere seems to lead the courts to search for ways in which to place
such blame on the plaintiffs. Unfortunately, when courts place moral blame
on plaintiffs (deservedly or not), they often also refuse to place any legal
responsibility on the employer.
One way in which courts place moral blame on victims of discrimina-
tion is through appeals to voluntarist ideology. In other words, courts often
implicitly say, "if you had done (or not done) X, we would not be here in
court today because no adverse employment action would have been taken;
therefore it is your fault, and we will not reward you for a situation that was
of your own making." It is easier for courts to go this route in disparate
impact cases because of the impossibility of placing moral culpability on
the employer. It is also easier to revert to voluntarism when the trait at issue
may be characterized as within the control of the victim.
In some cases, employment criteria that affect one group disproportion-
ately may be said to be immutable--for example, height and weight
requirements for prison guards in Alabama prisons that excluded many
women from those jobs 2-- but in many cases, such criteria cannot be
designated immutable. In fact, the case that created the disparate impact
cause of action, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., involved the use of a standard-
ized test and a high school diploma requirement for certain jobs that
disproportionately affected African-American job applicants." '3 Clearly,
See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987). More recent works on the
problematic relationship between intent and discrimination include David Crump,
Evidence, Race, Intent, and Evil: The Paradox of Purposelessness in the
Constitutional Race Discrimination Cases, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 285 (1998); Linda
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161
(1995); Ann C. McGinley, i Viva La Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive
in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 415 (2000); Deana A. Pollard,
Unconscious Bias and Self-CriticalAnalysis: The Casefor a Qualified Evidentiary
Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REv. 913 (1999); Amy L.
Wax, Discrimination As Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129 (1999).
112 See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
.. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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one's performance on a standardized test and whether one graduates from
high school are not "immutable" in any traditional sense of the word. Nor
are they "statuses" in the sense that race and sex are statuses. The Court,
however, did not consider the mutability of the criteria or the status/conduct
distinction relevant to its decision in the case in large part because it took
into account the social, economic, and educational discriminatory factors
that influenced the job criteria's unequal impact on African-Americans.
Justice Burger stated: "Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests
neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be
maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory
employment practices.""1 4 He went on to explain that African-Americans
had received inferior education in segregated schools, accounting for their
lower test scores." 5 Arguably, the Court could have simply stated that it
was up to the plaintiff class whether or not they obtained high school
diplomas and that the employer was not responsible for the disparity in test
scores. Such an argument would have made at least as much sense as the
invocations of voluntarist rhetoric in some of the other contexts discussed
in this Article.
Judicial commitment to recognizing and taking into account discrimina-
tory conditions that precede the workplace has waned considerably since
Griggs was decided, which in large part explains the winnowing away of
the disparate impact cause of action, particularly in the past twenty years
or so. In fact, given the increase in acceptance of the lack of interest
argument in later race cases, the Griggs Court's beneficence seems to be
the product of a bygone era. In some sense, the outcome in Griggs and the
contrasting outcome in Wards Cove may be reconciled by simply recogniz-
ing this: in 1971, many courts were predisposed to believe that job
segregation by race was due to discrimination, on the part of employers and
society in general, and to hold employers responsible for remedying that
segregation in their workplaces. By 1989, most courts were predisposed to
believe that job segregation by race was not due to discrimination but to
lack of interest, initiative, or sheer merit on the part of workers of color, for
which employers should not be held responsible. The rise of voluntarist
rhetoric coincided with this shift in attitudes.
An illustrative example of this phenomenon may be seen in the history
of challenges to employer policies that preclude or inhibit the hiring of
persons with arrest and conviction records. Such policies have been
challenged as having a racially disparate impact upon workers of color,
who are statistically more likely to have been arrested or convicted of a
"
4 Id. at 430.
115 Id.
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crime." 6 The outcomes in these cases, consistent with the outcomes of
many Title VII cases, were mixed at first and became decidedly anti-
plaintiff over time. Many plaintiffs fail to make out a prima facie case;" 7
those who do make out a prima facie case generally fail (or at least
experience equivocal success) at the business necessity stage."'
116 See Linda Lye, Comment, Title VIIs Tangled Tale: The Erosion and
Confusion ofDisparate Impact and the Business Necessity Defense, 19 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 315, 335--36 (1998). In general, courts have looked upon
consideration of arrest records in hiring far less favorably than use of conviction
records. Because an arrest carries no inference of guilt, it is difficult for an
employer to produce a business necessity justification for an arrest record policy.
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sheet Metal Workers, Local 102, 498 F. Supp. 952, 973
(D.D.C. 1980), aff'd, 702 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that because
employer failed to show that arrest record inquiries were job related, such inquiries
must be eliminated from the hiring process); Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F.
Supp. 401, 403 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (holding that employer's policy barring
individuals with arrest records from employment unlawfully discriminated against
African-American applicants), modified, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972).
"7 See, e.g., Cross v. United States Postal Serv., 639 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1981)
(holding that plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case in a disparate
impact case because she had not shown that Postal Service had a policy ofrejecting
applicants with criminal conviction records); Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793
(7th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff failed to show pattern or practice of use of arrest records
in disparate treatment claim); Matthews v. Runyon, 860 F. Supp. 1347 (E.D. Wis.
1994) (plaintiff did not present statistics showing that there was a racial disparity
in defendant's workplace or that any actual disparity was caused by its arrest-
record policy); Ray v. Frank, 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 696 (W.D. Mo.
1990) (plaintiff showed disparate treatment but not disparate impact where
alternate policy existed for hiring applicants with drivers license suspensions due
to non-moving violations and employer failed to apply this policy to hire plaintiff);
EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Fla. 1989)
(plaintiff failed to show disparity between number of Hispanics and non-Hispanics
employed by defendant or that any disparity was caused by no-conviction policy);
Smith v. Am. Serv. Co., Inc., 611 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (plaintiff failed to
establish existence of a policy of not hiring applicants with arrest records or that
her record was reason for employer's refusal to hire her), aff'd in relevant part,
vacated in part on other grounds, 796 F.2d 1430 (11 th Cir. 1986); Hill v. United
States Postal Serv., 522 F. Supp. 1283 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)(plaintiffdid not make out
prima facie case because Postal Service considered criminal record as one factor
but did not impose absolute bar on hiring applicants with criminal records).
18 See Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 549 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir. 1977) (affirming
an injunction that allowed the use of conviction records in hiring if the nature and
seriousness of the offense, length of time since conviction, and nature of the job
were taken into account); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971)
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The amazing thing about the early cases concerning the use of arrest
and conviction records in hiring is the complete absence of the voluntarist
rhetoric so prevalent in cases in the contexts previously discussed. The
courts stuck to the facts and the procedures for determining whether the at-
issue policies in fact had a disparate impact on workers of color and, if so,
whether the policies were justified by business necessity. Despite the fact
that no court has held that conviction records could never be used in the
hiring process, the agency of the convicted applicant to commit crimes or
not was never raised as a relevant consideration. Why, in the context in
which courts would arguably have the clearest and most justifiable
opportunity to blame the discriminatee for her plight, did the voluntarism
rhetoric the courts were so fond of in other Title VII cases never emerge?
Part of the reason lies in the difference between 1971 and 1989: the
commitment of many judges in the 1970s to enforce a statute aimed at
eliminating stark, highly visible discrimination had eroded by 1989,
including the Justices of the Supreme Court, who may have guided the
trend. The prevalence and outcomes of arrest and conviction cases support
this view. Most of the successful cases were brought in the 1970s, and
those that were brought after experienced far less success. The plaintiffs in
the 1970s cases were generally able to make out a prima facie case, even
where they were often challenging multiple policies." 9 The 1980s cases,
and the only 1990s case that considered this issue, uniformly found that the
plaintiffs had failed to make out a prima facie case."' Of course, this trend
is not inconsistent with the movement toward making it more difficult to
establish a prima facie case in disparate impact cases generally.
Two of the most recent criminal records cases reflect one wide-ranging
difference that the rise of voluntarist ideology in Title VII has had on
disparate impact cases. Both decisions make use of an arguably overly-
refined conception of relevant labor market to dispute the existence of a
racial imbalance in the employers' workforces. In Matthews v. Runyon, the
(holding that a criminal conviction should not constitute an absolute bar to
employment, although it may be fairly considered as to its bearing upon an
applicant's fitness for the job); Dozier v. Chupka, 395 F. Supp. 836 (S.D. Ohio
1975) (holding that fire department must use consideration of arrest and conviction
records in a manner related to job performance); Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of Am.,
332 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. La. 1971) (holding that it was reasonable for hotel to
require that individuals employed as bellmen have a record free of convictions for
property-related crimes), af'd, 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972).
n9 See, e.g., Green, 549 F.2d at 1158; Carter, 452 F.2d at 315; Dozier, 395 F.
Supp. at 836.
'
20 See Lye, supra note 116 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 92
GETING BEYOND THE BLAME GAME
court maintained that Matthews had not presented evidence that any fewer
African-Americans were hired than were "qualified applicants in the
relevant labor market" and thus had failed to establish a prima facie case.'2
Similarly, in EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., the court held that
the EEOC was unsuccessful in making out its prima facie case.'22 Although
the statistics presented did show that a greater proportion of Hispanics were
convicted than non-Hispanics and that, in general, an employment practice
that disqualified applicants with theft conviction records would adversely
affect Hispanics at a statistically significant rate, the court faulted the
EEOC for not presenting statistics that showed that there was a disparity
between the number of Hispanics and non-Hispanics in that particular
workplace."2 3
21Matthews, 860 F. Supp. at 1357 (challenging Postal Service policy of taking
arrest record into account in the hiring process).
" Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. at 755 (challenging employer
policy of refusing to hire any individual who had a criminal conviction for a theft-
related crime that resulted in an active prison sentence).
" Id. at 751. In particular, the court wanted to see applicant flow statistics that
in its opinion would demonstrate that the theft-conviction policy actually caused
any racial disparity. Applicant flow data are statistics that contrast the racial or
gender composition of applicants and hirees for the at-issue jobs. They have come
to be seen as probative evidence in Title VII claims because they provide concrete
evidence of how the hiring process actually operated. See generally RAMONA L.
PAETZOLD & STEVEN L. WILLBORN, THE STATISTICS OF DISCRIMINATION § 4.03,
at 7 (1998) (providing a model for analyzing employment discrimination cases
statistically). Applicant flow data have been criticized for concealing as much as
they reveal, however. In demanding that plaintiffs present applicant flow statistics
or statistics that show the number of otherwise qualified potential applicants, the
courts impose a burden upon Title VII plaintiffs that is legally problematic in two
ways. First, the preference for applicant flow data leaves unquestioned the effect
of the at-issue criteria on the applicant pool. This flies in the face of previous cases
holding that Title VII imposes no requirement that a disparate-impact prima facie
case be established only by use of comparative statistics on actual applicants. See,
e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977) (asserting that the applica-
tion process might not adequately reflect the potential applicant pool because of
such individuals' self-recognized inability to meet discriminatory criteria); Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 369 (1977) (noting that
employer's reputation for discrimination may have altered the applicant pool by
deterring African-Americans from applying). In supporting this conclusion in
Dothard, the Court noted that "[t]he application process might itselfnot adequately
reflect the actual potential applicant pool, since otherwise qualified people might
be discouraged from applying because of a self-recognized inability to meet the
very standards challenged as being discriminatory."Dothard, 433 U.S. at 330. The
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The requirement that plaintiffs present highly specific statistical
evidence and a tight causal connection in order to make out a prima facie
case of disparate impact discrimination124 stems in part from the growing
willingness to believe that racial disparities in the labor market are caused
by racial differences in merit rather than discrimination. This attitude
reflects a sort of broad-scale notion of voluntarism that moves beyond the
individual plaintiff and purports to describe that plaintiff's racial group on
the basis of presumptions about the individual qualities of its members.
Supporters of this argument claim that it is not racial discrimination to
reward and punish people on the basis of their individual merits. If some
groups just happen to statistically succeed where others happen to fail,
discrimination cannot be said to be the cause. If some members of a
statistically less successful group do succeed, moreover, this shows that
discrimination is not the cause of the rest of the group's failure. This is a
version of the conservative argument against affirmative action, another
Title VII context that may be said to reflect voluntarist ideology.
alternative to applicant flow data is statistics showing the number of otherwise
qualified minority applicants in the relevant labor market and that a disparity exists
between that percentage and the percentage of minorities employed in the at-issue
jobs. This alternative presents the Title VII plaintiff with a Hobson's choice, as
these data are, for occupations that require specialized education and/or training,
often difficult or impossible to gather.
1241 do not argue that the Carolina Freight court created the tough standards to
which it held the EEOC. Those standards were put forth by the Supreme Court in
cases such as Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994-95 (1988)
and Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653 (1989). In early cases,
statistics were not required to be so specific. In Griggs, for example, the statistics
presented with regard to the high school diploma criterion showed only that twelve
percent of African-American males had completed high school in North Carolina,
while thirty-four percent of white males had done so. Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). In Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329 (holding that height and
weight requirements had a disparate impact on women in violation of Title VII),
the Court had asserted that "(t)here is no requirement... that a statistical showing
of disproportionate impact must always be based on analysis of the characteristics
of the actual applicants." For a case on point that uses general population statistics,
see Haynie v. Chupka, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 267 (S.D. Ohio 1976)
(holding that general population statistics establishing that 4.2% of local police
department personnel were African-American while 18.5% of local population was
African-American were sufficient to make out prima facie case of disparate
impact). Even if one argues that in these three cases the general population
statistics were appropriate because the skills needed for the at-issue jobs were
minimal, it is unclear why employment with the Postal Service or at a freight
company would require qualifications so much more rare or specialized.
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Beyond this more attenuated conception of voluntarism, the court in
Carolina Freight engaged in the most extended and venomous use of
traditional voluntarist analysis encountered in all the Title VII cases. Given
the controversial nature of the subject of race and crime, it was surprising
that such views had not shown up in this context before, but the court in
Carolina Freight attempted to make up for lost time when it ranted:
Obviously a rule refusing honest employment to convicted applicants is
going to have a disparate impact upon thieves. That some of these thieves
are going to be Hispanic is immaterial. That apparently a higher percent-
age of Hispanics are convicted of crimes than that of the "White"
population may prove a number of things such as: (1) Hispanics are not
very good at stealing, (2) Whites are better thieves than Hispanics, (3)
none of the above, (4) all of the above.
If Hispanics do not wish to be discriminated against because they
have been convicted of theft then, they should stop stealing ....
In this case, the court will answer a question that federal courts have
vacillated on since the adoption of [Title VII]: Can an employer refuse to
hire persons convicted of a felony even though it has a disparate impact
on minority members?
This court's answer is a firm "Yes."'
125
In general, voluntarism has impacted disparate impact cases because of the
more attenuated chain of causation and the need to place moral blame, both
of which show up in full force in Carolina Freight. That these views are
now mainstream points to a pressing need for us to rethink the way we look
at causation and responsibility. Clearly, voluntarism alone is insufficient.
mT[. WHY VOLUNTARISM?
This section examines the question of why voluntarism has exerted
such influence over the outcomes of Title VII cases. It is important to note
1' Carolina Freight, 723 F. Supp. at 753. Contrast this with the view of the
court in Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1298-99 (8th Cir. 1975):
We cannot conceive of any business necessity that would automatically
place every individual convicted of any offense, except a minor traffic
offense, in the permanent ranks of the unemployed. This is particularly true
for blacks who have suffered and still suffer from the burdens of discrimi-
nation in our society. To denyjob opportunities to these individuals because
of some conduct which may be remote in time or does not significantly bear
upon the particular job requirements is an unnecessarily harsh and unjust
burden.
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two related but distinct trends in these cases. The first is a judicial
predisposition in favor of employee assimilation to dominant cultural
norms, which occurs in some of the contexts outlined above. For example,
the language cases and dress code cases reflect assimilationist bias, but the
lack of interest cases do not. In other words, in lack of interest cases the
employer does not necessarily want the plaintiff class of employees to
apply for the more highly-rewarded jobs, much less demand that they do so
as a condition of employment. In fact, it is unclear whether failing to
express interest in such jobs or applying for them would be considered
assimilation by the employers. In the dress code cases, on the other hand,
employers not only desire assimilation, but require it as a condition of
employment.
The second trend is judicial reliance on a set of ideas about individual
agency and responsibility to justify decisions that absolve employers from
responsibility for various forms of workplace discrimination. This is a
separate inquiry from the question of assimilation although it is certainly
the case that assimilationist bias contexts comprise a significant share of
the use ofvoluntarist rhetoric. However, the important factors here are why
courts have found the language of agency and choice so compelling as to
be the preferred vehicle to express their support for employers over
employees in both kinds of cases and what that support might signify.
A. The Relevance of Equal Protection
As has been discussed at length by commentators too numerous to
name, equal protection jurisprudence is analytically muddled, internally
incoherent, and effectually inadequate. One of the primary flaws in equal
protection jurisprudence is the so-called immutability factor." 6 The
delineation of immutability as a basis for extending heightened protection
to groups has been roundly criticized elsewhere for being a false criterion
127
or an ill-advised one. 12 ' There are some indications that the Supreme Court
12 As every first-year law student is aware, modem equal protection jurispru-
dence evolved primarily from the famous (now perhaps infamous) Footnote Four
in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938), from
which the immutability criterion may fairly be said to have originated. The criterion
was cemented in several later cases. See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602
(1987).
217 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 150 (1980); J.M.
Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313,2323-24 (1997); Janet E.
Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics ofBiology: A Critique ofthe Argument
from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REv. 503,507-16 (1994).
128 See, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 22, at 504-05.
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may be close to officially retiring the immutability criterion-at least from
the dominant position it once held. 9 It is clear, however, from reading
Title VII decisions from many of the above-discussed contexts that the
notion of immutability remains a persuasive ideological framework for
many courts in the employment discrimination context. For example, in the
dress and grooming cases the courts could not help but point out ad
nauseum that hair length, style of dress, and even weight were not
immutable as a justification for upholding impermissibly discriminatory
standards." 0
Another problem with equal protection law that has diffused into Title
VII jurisprudence is the problem of intent. In the law of equal protection,
the government must have intended to discriminate to have committed a
constitutional violation; there is no Fourteenth Amendment equivalent to
disparate impact analysis.' As discussed previously, 32 the Title VII
disparate impact cause of action challenges the notion that discrimination
is always the result of intent and thus creates the problem of imposing legal
liability without a corresponding moral culpability. It is perhaps due in part
to the rejection of disproportionate impact analysis in equal protection
jurisprudence that courts have such a difficult time accepting that uninten-
tional discrimination should be the basis for employer liability under Title
VII as well. It is much easier to explain away unequal results by blaming
the individual employee, thereby dispersing the problem and placing the
responsibility for societal change away from employers.
Nevertheless, since equal protection and Title VII jurisprudence
developed somewhat in tandem, and because each informs the other, this
problem cannot be said to originate in equal protection law. Rather, we
129 See id. at 490-91 (noting that courts have cited academic critiques of
immutability, interpreted it expansively, stated that it is a factor rather than a
requirement, and omitted it from analyses of the heightened scrutiny test, all of
which have cast doubt on its continued vitality).
130 See, e.g., Earwood v. Cont'l S.E. Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir.
1976) (noting that "[h]air length is not an immutable characteristic for it may be
changed at will"); Cox v. Delta Air Lines, No. 75-1639-Civ.-CA, 1976 WL 730,
*1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 1976) (holding that "weight is neither an immutable
characteristic nor a constitutionally protected category").
131 See, e.g., Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279-81 (1979)
(ruling that a disproportionate impact may be traced to a discriminatory purpose but
a neutral law does not alone violate the Equal Protection Clause); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245-46 (1976) (holding that disproportionate impact is not
irrelevant, but it is not alone dispositive of the question "is a statute unconstitution-
ally discriminatory?").
'
3 1 See infra notes 111-25 and accompanying text.
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must ask how equal protection came to incorporate the immutability and
intent elements.
B. The Dominance of Christianity
An often-overlooked factor in explaining American courts' affinity for
choice-based rhetoric is the role of Christianity in the development of
Anglo-American law and in contemporary American society. Christian
doctrine generally stresses the free will of the individual to obey God or to
sin, and the exercise of that will in one's life decides her eternal fate.'33
Christianity is and has always been the dominant religion in American
society and, indeed, has been the foremost ideology for almost the entirety
of recent Western history. 34 Our society is steeped in Christianity-based
norms, though this fact is rarely discussed because of the lingering
numerical power of Christians and (somewhat paradoxically) the percep-
tion that the major non-Christian religions are basically integrated into
American culture. In truth, almost all federal judges in the United States are
probably members of some Christian denomination. Even if that were not
so, however, Christian doctrine has indelibly shaped the formation of our
cultural and legal consciousnesses. Thus, it is quite likely that the
popularity and ubiquity of the Christian world view that accounts in part for
the widespread use of voluntarist rhetoric in judicial reasoning.
C. The Ideology of Merit
Related to, but distinct from, the influence of Christianity's cultural
dominance is the "ideology of merit." This is the desire of the individual to
attribute her status and achievements to her own character, conduct, and/or
intrinsic worth, and the corresponding belief that an individual who fails to
achieve has only herself to blame. 35 This idea, which has also been referred
133 See, e.g., SMILEY, supra note 15, at 58-71 (discussing Christian concept of
free will and contrasting it with Aristotelian and modem philosophical views of
free will); cf KANE, supra note 10, at 7-8 (noting that debates over free will have
been a central preoccupation of Christianity and Western intellectual history
generally, but that they have also played a role in many other world religions).
134 See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS:
A CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1997) (offering
a compelling account of Christianity's dominance in America and its role in
creating the concept of separation of church and state to further its own ends).
3  See Linda Hamilton Krieger, Afterword: Socio-Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 476, 511-12 (2000) (noting that "a substantial body of research
indicates that patterns of causal attribution powerfully affect both people's willingness
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to as the "meritocracy myth,"' 36 draws on a long cultural legacy of myths
and legends that appeal to the desire of Americans to believe that anyone
can succeed if she has enough intelligence, perseverance, and work ethic.
It is embodied in phrases such as "rags to riches," "self-made man," "pull
yourself up by your bootstraps," and "the American dream."
Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, Americans have
doggedly maintained the belief that economic inequality reflects differ-
ences in individual talent and motivation to succeed rather than unequal
opportunities and systemic discrimination.33 The power of this myth or
ideology in our cultural consciousness suggests that it forms part of the
foundation upon which judges reach their decisions; that is, it is visible on
their normative horizons and informs their perceptions of litigants,
including plaintiffs in antidiscrimination cases.
D. The Role of Economics
Another important factor that one might argue has a significant effect
upon courts' willingness to find for plaintiffs in Title VII cases is the effect
of liability for discrimination on the ability of the employer to compete in
the marketplace. Two examples of this idea come to mind. First, the
business necessity standard of the disparate impact cause of action may be
met by showing that discontinuing reliance on the disputed criteria would
be costly to the employer. 31 Courts seem reluctant to impose such costs on
employers, even in the name of the anti-discrimination principle. On the
other hand, in disparate impact cases, courts are unwilling to interpret the
business necessity standard in any way favorable to plaintiffs. 39 Second,
to help a stigmatized other and their support for needs-based distribution in general")
(footnote omitted); see also IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF
DIFFERENCE 200 (1990).
136 See, e.g., Anne Lawton, The Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of Equal
Employment Opportunity, 85 MINN. L. REv. 587,592-94 (2000).
137 See SONIA OSPINA, ILLUSIONS OF OPPORTUNITY: EMPLOYEE EXPECTATIONS
AND WORKPLACE INEQUALITY 13-14 (1996).
138 See, e.g., Abbott v. Fed. Forge, Inc., 912 F.2d 867, 875 (6th Cir. 1990)
(holding that minimizing cost of labor is a legitimate business consideration for
Title VII purposes); Spurlock v. United Airlines, 475 F.2d 216, 218-20 (10th Cir.
1972) (holding that costs associated with training are an example of a consideration
that qualifies as a business necessity).
"' On the business necessity standard after the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see
generally Michael Carvin, Disparate Impact Claims Under the New Title VII, 68
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1153 (1993) (asserting that Wards Cove remains the correct
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in workplace appearance cases, the employers and courts have pointed to
the right to project a certain image-generally characterized as "conserva-
tive" or "business-like"--as a reason to find dress and grooming codes as
outside the scope of Title VII altogether. 40 What this implicitly says is that
the employer is afraid of customer or employee reaction to, for example,
men with long hair, individuals with all-braided hairstyles, or men wearing
earrings. For example, in Oiler v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., the plaintiff
was terminated for cross-dressing in his non-working life. 4' The em-
ployer's excuse for the termination was that if Oiler "were recognized by
Winn-Dixie customers as a crossdresser, the customers... would disap-
prove of [his] lifestyle.... [T]hey would shop elsewhere and Winn-Dixie
would lose business."' 2 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the court found for Winn-
Dixie on summary judgment. 43
E. The Goal of Maintaining the Status Quo
Ultimately, the above reasons are helpful in understanding the courts'
reliance on voluntarism, but they fail to provide a complete account of it.
Because there are exceptions to the use of voluntarist precepts, voluntarism
itself is not the organizing principle around which the courts have based
their interpretations of Title VII in particular contexts. Rather, it is merely
an attractive medium through which to express some other principle(s), as
yet unarticulated by the courts.
In examining the above cases, it is impossible to overlook the fact that
courts discuss not just the choices of the employee--to wear his hair long,
standard after the 1991 Act); Susan S. Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in
Disparate Impact Discrimination Cases, 30 GA. L. REv. 387 (1996) (arguing for
a strict business necessity standard under the Act); Andrew J. Spiropoulos,
Defining the Business Necessity Defense to the Disparate Impact Cause ofAction:
Finding the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REv. 1479 (1996) (describing the positions
of both proponents of a strict standard and those who argue that the Wards Cove
standard survives the Act); Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: The Business
Necessity Standard, 106 HARv. L. REV. 896 (1993) (arguing that the Act overruled
the Wards Cove standard of business. necessity).
'40 See, e.g., Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 233 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (noting that defendant asserted that its no-braids policy "was adopted in
order to help American project a conservative and business-like image"); Fagan v.
Nat'l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1124-25 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
'41 Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. 00-3114,2002 WL 31098541, at *2 (E.D.
La. Sept. 16, 2002).
142Id.
'43 Id. at *8.
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to speak Spanish, to observe religious holidays, to apply for certain posi-
tions-but also the choices of the employer. Ironically, although in some
cases the courts have treated employees' right to choose as trivial, they
have often simultaneously magnified the importance of the employer's
interest in regulating the workplace.'" Certainly, employers have some
interest in dictating how their employees behave during working hours;
under Title VII, the touchstone of this inquiry is whether the regulation in
question is job-related and necessary to running its business (for disparate
impact claims) or a bona fide occupational qualification (for disparate
treatment claims). As it stands now, though, the courts have ceded so much
regulatory freedom to employers that the effectuation of Title VII's goals
has been severely compromised.
This preference for the prerogatives of employers cannot be explained
away simply by musing that courts are taking into account employers' fear
that their ability to be competitive in the marketplace would be undermined
by overzealous enforcement of Title VII, or the courts' own fear that the
federal judicial system would be overburdened with employment discrimi-
nation claims as a result of such enforcement. Though these concerns are
understandable, they cannot fully explain the elevation of an employer's
right to determine "how best to run [its] shop"'' 4 over the statutorily-given
right of the employee to be free from discrimination on the prohibited
bases. This is demonstrated by the fact that in some contexts--notably the
lack of interest argument and the unwelcomeness requirement in sexual
harassment-it is the employees' choices that are the most significant to the
courts, while the employer's choices and consequences flowing from them
recede into the background. In fact, the narrowness with which Title VII
has been interpreted, particularly in the past twenty years, has compara-
tively little to do with money, employers, or crowded court dockets, and
much more to do with the conservative backlash 46 against the cultural
revolution that occurred in the mid-twentieth century.
For example, Schultz and Petterson documented a correlation between
the rise of certain neo-conservative beliefs, such as a belief that workplace
discrimination is no longer a significant force for workers of color and that
affirmative action is thus unjustified, and judicial acceptance of the lack of
' See Bartlett, supra note 37, at 2556-59; Engle, supra note 21, at 350-52;
Klare, supra note 37, at 1400-01.
145 Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975).
'"6Though the word "backlash" is hackneyed, I believe it is an apt way to
describe the cultural trends that have sought to undermine the antisubordination
project for the past thirty years or so. See Krieger, supra note 135.
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interest argument in race cases. 4 7 The effect of the increased acceptance of
the lack of interest argument by the courts, predictably, is the unchecked
perpetuation of de factojob segregation. The perspective that this is beyond
Title VIl's reach is fully consistent with what Anne Lawton calls the
"meritocracy myth"--the belief that employment discrimination is anoma-
lous and that unequal employment outcomes are not the result of discrimi-
nation but of differences in innate ability, willingness to work hard, and the
like. " ' The trend in the outcomes of the arrest and conviction records cases
also reflects the ascendancy of these ideas in the American consciousness
in the past few decades.
In fact, egregious stereotypes permeate most of the contexts discussed
above in which voluntarism rhetoric showed up. For instance, the dress and
grooming cases in the context of race reflect anglocentric views of what
hair should look like and how it should be styled and give employers the
right to impose those racist views on their employees.' The English-only
cases exhibit antiimmigrant and racial biases and parallel the rise of the
movement to have English declared the official language of the United
States and individual states. The unwelcomeness requirement in sexual
harassment cases suggests sexist stereotypes of women as powerful
temptresses who lead men on and then dishonestly cry sexual harassment.
The sex-based dress and grooming cases, the sexual orientation cases, and
the transsexual cases all serve to police the gender lines that the feminist
and gay rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s had sought to blur by
narrowly defining sex discrimination.
All of these phenomena are related to each other and provide the
foundation upon which much of Title VII jurisprudence has been built. Of
course, this means that the courts have, through creative interpretation
motivated by the very biases it was designed to address, reduced a
potentially transformative statute to little more than a wistful memory of
what might have been. Professor Linda Hamilton Krieger describes this
process eloquently:
Biased judicial ... construal can result from ... subtle mechanisms
through which entrenched norms and institutionalized practices, operating
as taken-for-granted background rules, systematically skew the interpreta-
tions of transformative legal rules so that those rules increasingly come to
resemble the normative and institutional systems they were intended to
141 See Schultz & Petterson, supra note 28, at 1087-89.
148 See Lawton, supra note 136, at 592-99.
149 See Caldwell, supra note 26.
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displace. Eventually, if these interpretive biases operate unconstrained,
the new transformative law may provide a vehicle for the reassertion and
relegitimation of the very norms and institutions it was designed to
undermine.
150
As this Article has shown, in many cases voluntarist rhetoric has been the
courts' weapon of choice in gutting Title VII of its transformative potential.
For reasons explained below, its use was improper.
IV. TOWARD GETrING BEYOND THE BLAME GAME
This section contests the courts' flippant assignments of blame to the
actions or characteristics of the plaintiffs in the Title VII contexts discussed
in Part II. Even if the plaintiffs themselves contributed in some way to the
situations that led to the lawsuits, the use of voluntarist ideology to justify
decisions in favor of employers is deficient, both because it is victim-
blaming and because it does not appropriately address the merits of an
employment discrimination claim. Other commentators have reached this
conclusion; however, this Article takes this concept a step further and
argues that appeals to voluntarism should be abandoned because their
veracity is questionable. In other words, it is impossible to know for certain
whose choices and which choices are freely made or how freely they are
made. Moreover, when the employer's desired outcomes as to the at-issue
choices are more well-represented among those who already enjoy race,
gender, religious, and other advantages, it seems fair to say that the choices
of such individuals are more free with respect to the desired outcomes than
the choices of individuals who are not so advantaged. This inequality is so
closely connected to the inequalities Title VII was designed to address that
it must be explicitly taken into account if the statute is to have any chance
of achieving its goals.
In the context of cases in which the basis of the decision concerns
assimilation (such as English-only rules or employer dress codes), I join
previous commentators in contending that such discrimination does fall
within the purview of Title VII and that the business necessity and
Bonafide Occupational Qualification ("BFOQ") inquiries should be
dispositive15' Even if in some cases it is a legitimate goal of the employer
K50 rieger, supra note 135, at 486.
'5' See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 37, at 2576-77; Bayer, supra note 21, at
772-73. Of course, the business necessity and BFOQ standards are inquiries unto
themselves; to say "business necessity should be the standard" is not saying much.
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or society in general to demand conformity to certain norms, 152 it is not
legitimate for Title VII to be used retroactively to penalize employees who
failed to conform. This is especially so because one ostensible goal of Title
VII was meant to change some of the very norms that are being contested
in these cases. Because we have no way of deciding in advance which of
these norms are legitimate and which are impermissibly discriminatory, all
claims that involve departure from the standards preferred by the employer
should be interpreted in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. If
compliance with the at-issue norms is truly legitimate (nondiscriminatory
on a prohibited basis) and necessary to the employer, that fact will come
out in the course of the litigation.
In cases in which assimilation is not directly at issue, voluntarist
arguments are even more clearly objectionable. The problem with courts'
acceptance of the lack of interest argument, for example, is that it fails to
acknowledge the employer's power in shaping the supposedly "free"
choices of applicants and the influence of the courts in giving effect to that
power. 153 Even if the alleged preferences of minority and women employees
for lower-paying, less rewarding work (itself a hard-to-swallow idea) were
in part formed separately from and prior to the working world, however,
that would still fail to exonerate the lack-of-interest argument because the
relevant Title VII issue is not whether the employer intended to segregate
the work force but whether the employer may engage in practices which
perpetuate segregation.
Whether assimilation is at issue or not in a case, the use of voluntarism
rhetoric functions in a similar way: to divert attention from the issue of
For the record, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 dictates, a strict business necessity
standard that requires an employer to show both that the practice or policy in
question is related to a legitimate business interest and that it is job-related for the
position in question. Similarly, BFOQ is a standard that was meant to be met only
rarely.
112 See Yoshino, supra note 22, at 505-06 (noting that "assimilation has positive
as well as negative aspects" and arguing that the important inquiry is when and in
what contexts encouraging or demanding assimilation is appropriate). This is rarely
acceptable. In fact, of all the examples discussed in this Article, the only one that
presents a possible case of a norm to which employers and society have a legitimate
interest in seeing individuals conform is the context of arrest and conviction
records. In other words, one might argue that we as a society want to encourage
individuals to refrain from committing crimes. Even that claim is more ambiguous
than it might first appear, however, because it requires an unquestioning acceptance
of the notion of criminal conduct as it is currently constituted.
3 See Schultz, supra note 30, at 1839-43.
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discrimination so as to absolve the employer of any responsibility for it.
Rather than focusing on the narrow and counterproductive question of
moral blame, one might ask who is better able to address the problems of
employment discrimination and job segregation in a particular workforce.
Is it the employer or the individual worker? In most cases, the employer is
in a better position to do so. It seems likely that Congress was aware of this
and intended to acknowledge it by passing Title VII. The displacing of
responsibility from the employer to the employee through the use of notions
of individual choice serves only to impede the amelioration of these
problems.
An expansive reading of Title VII suggests that the purpose of the
statute was not simply to prohibit "discrimination" in employment against
women, racial minorities, and religious minorities, but to dismantle the
hierarchies that undergird such discrimination and promote true equality by
transforming employment, a central site of identity formation for most
Americans. Such a transformation would affect not just employment per se
but indeed the entire social and economic infrastructure. The economic
stratification of our society along race, gender, and other invidious lines
(such as national origin) is, then, what Title VII must attack if it is to have
any significant, lasting effect.
Thus, one of the major reasons to remain skeptical about the norms
preferred by employers is that such norms privilege, in the employment
context, those who are already privileged in other contexts in such a way as
to implicate considerations far beyond the question of individual liberty.
Rather, Title VII's promise is to reduce the extent to which some individu-
als are privileged above others in the employment context and to extend
equal opportunities in employment to individuals regardless of their race,
sex, national origin, or religion. In order for true equality of opportunity to
become a reality, we must engage in a full-scale rethinking of many of the
cultural norms that we now take for granted. We must also question whether
conforming to such norms is really simply a matter of choice.
Professor Bayer, for example, correctly diagnoses the evil inherent in
the way courts have differentiated between "mutable" and "immutable"
traits but fails to question the mutable/immutable dichotomy itself. He does
not disagree with the courts that speaking English in the workplace, for
example, is a matter of choice;" 4 instead, he argues that such conduct
"' See Bayer, supra note 21, at 774 ("To simply respond that a mutable char-
acteristic is one that the individual may, by definition, easily change, wrongly pre-
sumes that there is little or no harm to the individual who is compelled either to
make such a change or forego an employment opportunity.... [Employers] should
not have the authority to compel a worker to make such a choice.").
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should be protected under Title VII because it is closely related to a
protected status and because it is constitutive of identity.' While his
contentions are debatable, they do not provide a complete account of why
the mutable/immutable distinction is critically flawed and should thus be
abandoned.
When courts speak of immutable traits, they generally refer to traits
that are both not amenable to change and that are biologically determined.
Yet, as a number of commentators have pointed out in examining the
immutability criteria in equal protection law, not all protected statuses are
biologically determined,'56 and not all biologically determined statuses are
protected.5 7 Kenji Yoshino argues that the so-called mutable/immutable
distinction would be more accurately characterized as a line drawn
"between'corporeal' and'social' traits."s 8 This reconceptualization of the
distinction better captures the essence of the assumptions from which the
courts appear to be drawing in deciding these cases. At the same time, it is
important to recognize that the widespread assumption is that biology is to
culture as immutable is to mutable and to avoid unquestioningly accepting
this conflation as fact. Indeed, the opposite may be more accurate.
For example, Eve Sedgwick has argued that the historical conflation of
nature/nurture and immutability/mutability "may be in the process of direct
reversal," as "[i]ncreasingly it is the conjecture that a particular trait is
genetically or biologically based, not that it is 'only cultural' that seems to
trigger an estrus of manipulative fantasy in the technological institutions of
the culture."'5 9 In other words, in an age in which Michael Jackson can
' See id. at 839. Bayer states:
The fact that behavior or custom may easily or not easily be altered provides
few clues regarding the personal importance attached to such behavior or
custom. Individuals define themselves, express their singular personalities,
and conceive their special identities through a wide amalgam of acts,
including choice of clothing, personal grooming, language, and other
arguably mutable characteristics. If we recognize that individual dignity,
personal freedom, and sense of self are often intimately tied to mutable
characteristics, then we must criticize the cavalier fashion with which courts
dismiss individuals' claims that employers' racially, sexually, or ethnically
premised rules unjustly restrict personal integrity and expression.
Id.
156 Religion is the most notable exception.
"s For example, intelligence probably has a biological component but is
unlikely to become a protected status. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying
text.
158 Yoshino, supra note 22, at 495.
s Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, How to Bring Your Kids Up Gay: The War on
Effeminate Boys, in TENDENCIES 154, 163-64 (1993).
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almost literally become white, sex-conversion surgery ensures that the sex
of one's body is not fixed at birth, and as genetic engineering looms on the
horizon, it seems clear that many biologically based traits are already, or
are in the process of becoming, mutable. Might this renewed interest in
tinkering with nature signify that we have come to the conclusion that, at
least with respect to the individual, it is easier to change biology than
culture? If the answer is yes, then the law must rethink its reliance on
notions of voluntarism in deciding Title VII cases.
It is far from clear that requiring compliance with majoritarian norms
or absolving employers from responsibility for their role in perpetuating the
effects of societal discrimination is as simple or unproblematic a matter as
courts seem to suggest. The actions of individuals are located within social
and cultural matrices that limit or narrow the ostensibly infinite range of
choices that each person perceives are available to them at any given
time.160 The use of voluntarist ideology to justify discriminatory outcomes
functions in such a way as to freeze those cultural matrices in place and
prevent individuals from moving outside them, frustrating the effectuation
of the goals of Title VII.
The cultural matrices that limit the range of an individual's realistic
choices are economic, racial, and gendered in nature, among many other
factors. It is sometimes the case that the range of an individual's perceived
choices represents a continuum whose endpoints might be perceived as
"assimilative" and "non-assimilative" with respect to the norms of the
dominant culture. For example, an African-American woman might choose
to straighten her hair (the most assimilative choice), to wear it in braids
(somewhere in the middle), or to wear it in dreadlocks or let it "go natural"
(less assimilative choices). In other cases, an individual's choices, either as
she perceives them or as they actually exist (itself a false dichotomy
because the only choices that may in any meaningful sense be said to exist
are those perceived by the individual) may not extend to both ends of the
continuum, and the question of assimilation may be moot. But the crucial
question is: assimilative with respect to what? In the context of Title VII,
the answer is the preferences of employers, whose decisions have only been
minimally limited by interpretations of Title VII. To privilege the choices
of employers over the choices of employees in the context of Title VII
160 I first realized this during my first year of law school, as I walked by
construction workers who were working on the renovation of the law school one
bright fall morning. It occurred to me then that it was likely that attending Yale
Law School was no more a realistic possibility for them than being a construction
worker was for me. The idea for this Article was in some sense born that day.
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claims is deeply problematic because the employers who make these
decisions are the very individuals who are situated in a privileged position
vis-i-vis one or more of the status hierarchies that Title VII should serve to
help dismantle.
Specifically, what this means is that when the employer's conveniences
and preferences are served by its employees' Sabbath falling on Sunday
rather than Saturday, for example, the "choice" of the Christian employee
to observe her Sabbath is facilitated and the "choice" of the Jewish or
Seventh Day Adventist employee to observe her Sabbath is constrained.
The Christian's freedom to choose is not equal to the Jews' because they
are differently situated with respect to the non-neutral rule. Similarly, for
all the Rogers court's protestations to the contrary, an employer preference
that employees not wear their hair in braids is almost invariably going to
affect only the "choices" of African-American women. Rogers' "choice"
whether to wear her hair in braids was certainly less free than the choice of
a white man not to wear his hair in braids.
When an employer argues that a sexual harassment victim chose to "ask
for it" by dressing or talking in a way her harasser considered provocative,
for example, or punishes the "choice" an employee makes to speak Spanish
in the workplace or to undergo sex-conversion surgery, the employer is
usually reflecting an "insider" perspective. Employers often perceive the
existence of a different set of accessible choices for the recalcitrant
employee than she perceives are meaningfully available to her. She is not
as free to conform to the employer's demands as the employer believes she
is. In many cases, by the time the argument about choice is made she no
longer has the option to make the choices the employer, and the courts,
would have preferred that she make. In these ways, appeals to voluntarism
are often a means of punishing plaintiffs who not only do not, but perhaps
in some meaningful way cannot, conform to dominant norms of acceptable
behavior or appearance, regardless of the actual merits of their discrimina-
tion claims. In these cases, courts privilege the norms preferred by
employers over the interests of the employee plaintiffs in such a way as to
hinder the transformative project of employment discrimination law.
Because employment serves not only as an important site of identity
formation but also as an individual's very livelihood, employers already
exercise tremendous power over workers. The prevailing interpretation of
Title VII, with its emphasis on the individual choices of plaintiffs, ensures
that this power will remain considerable.
In the context of the philosophical debate with which this Article
begins, I would argue that determinism is mostly true, and free will mostly
false. But I join Susan Wolf in arguing that acknowledging the inadequacy
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of prevailing ideas about free will does not necessarily entail an abandon-
ment of responsibility. 6' What it does entail is a rethinking of how we
allocate responsibility and its attendant costs. Once we recognize that
discrimination is not an act perpetrated by individuals, but a societal
phenomenon that is sustained through institutions and institutional
practices, the obvious solution to the problem is to encourage social change
by changing institutions rather than punishing individuals. This is not an
argument against assigning responsibility but about placing it upon the
institutions that can bear it and for whom bearing it is likely to produce the
consequences that we supposedly are striving for--a more equal society.
So far, reliance on the ideology ofvoluntarism has facilitated an interpreta-
tion of Title VII that undermines the very purposes for which it was created
and punishes those whom it was designed to help.
If a world in which all persons are presumptively equal and possess
meaningful opportunities and choices about how to live their lives is a goal
that is worth striving for, then the law must allocate the burdens of moving
toward that world such that they fall more heavily on those who have more
power, rather than on those who have less. If we are to begin to dismantle
the status hierarchies that are crippling our democracy, voluntarism rhetoric
must be exposed for what it is: a false ideology whose end is not to reward
the virtuous, but to punish the already-disadvantaged.
161 See Wolf, supra note 17, at 101.
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